Institute for Palestine Studies

Review: Nazis, Zionists, and Arabs
Author(s): Lenni Brenner
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mediation attempts, including Israel's tough military responses to fida'iyyin raids launched from Gaza soil. He also mentions briefly two other simultaneous, unrelated sets of talks (Egyptian-Israeli contacts in Paris; Eric Johnston's mission on behalf of President Eisenhower). Their existence may have complicated Jackson's efforts more seriously than his account indicates.

Jackson's retrospective analysis of his unsuccessful mission and his deeper musings about the conflict (mainly chapters 5, 6, and Epilogue) are, unfortunately, uneven. Some observations appear perceptive, others banal. A few remarks—such as Jackson's claim that the success of his mission might have averted not only the 1956 Suez Campaign but also "three subsequent Middle Eastern wars" and "many years of recrimination and bloodshed" (p. 9)—are downright questionable. But his book is always honest and does not suffer too much from the inflated self-importance which tends to characterize works of this kind. Like other personal memoirs, Middle East Mission can offer us only a fragment of a much larger story; serious scholars will need to read Jackson's brief account in conjunction with other memoirs, diaries, and archival materials on Egypt-Israeli relations and on U.S. policy during the 1950s.

If Jackson's account is strongest when he deals with the interaction between his own informal contacts and Washington's (non-)policy, his analysis is weakest with regard to the regional dimension of the conflict. True, Jackson's mission took place during a period when Palestinian leadership was suffering a near-total eclipse. True, the political agenda of those days included the items "Arab-Israeli conflict" or the "Arab refugee problem," but not the "Palestinian question." Perhaps it is therefore understandable that, at the time of his mission, Jackson did not question the premise that the Palestine issue could be resolved without the participation of Palestinian leaders.

What is disappointing, however, is that, in a retrospective analysis written in 1982, he should offer no critical comments on the merits of such an approach to a solution. In fact, Jackson seems to take for granted that a settlement of the Palestine-Israel conflict can be reached simply by coordinating the goodwill, determination, and political interests of powerful non-Palestinian leaders in the area. Jackson is eager to show readers that Anwar Sadat was not the first Egyptian leader to have made an effort to resolve the conflict with Israel, and clearly expects his account of Nasir's 1955 overture to encourage today's would-be peacemakers in the region (pp. 9–11, 17, 86, 100).

Yet Jackson does not seem to recognize that the search for a Palestine settlement through Nasir and Ben-Gurion was merely one of many repetitions of the classic pattern set by Chaim Weizmann and Amir Faisal back in 1918–19, a pattern which has seldom met with lasting positive results. It is this pattern—more than the personal motivations and constraints of this or that "great leader"—which needs thoughtful analysis if one wishes to understand fully the failure of such third-party mediation efforts. One should not ignore, as Jackson does, the complex inter-Arab dimension and the relationship between Palestinians and the Arab regimes in the region.

Nazis, Zionists, and Arabs

Reviewed by Lenni Brenner*

Coming after Lukasz Hirszowicz's *The Third Reich and the Arab East*, Lenni Brenner's *Zionism in the Age of the Dictators*, and Edwin Black's *The Transfer Agreement*, Nicosia's slender work adds little to the informed public's knowledge of Nazism's concrete interplay with either Zionists or Palestinians. Hence it will be little used in the perpetual propaganda battle over Zionist and Palestinian collaboration with the Nazis. The book's real value lies in its description of Hitler's racial theories about Arabs and Jews, and his support, throughout the 1930s, for Britain's empire, in Palestine and everywhere else.

Nicosia is obviously in love with German, and is forever throwing in lines from that language from these bureaucratic papers. Mercifully he accompanies them with translations. But after a while, the reader comes to anticipate these unwelcomed student lessons with dread. In general, the book is marred by its dry academic style. Or rather its lack of style, or, more precisely, its utter lack of passion and value judgments. Nazism, Zionism, and Palestinian nationalism are certainly all among the more emotionally charged ideologies of our century. But you would never know it by Nicosia. He went to every German archive, and has doubtlessly read every Nazi document on the Middle East, down to the last umlaut, and turned up nothing new of the least significance.

At one point he calls upon Arab scholars to research the Palestinian side of these events. Certainly the full story of the Mufti of Jerusalem's futile efforts to get Nazi support against Zionism in the 1930s needs to be told, as well as his subsequent collaboration with the Axis during the war. Any such analysis could doubtlessy draw lessons applicable to today's Palestinian movement and its relations to today's superpowers. But that is exactly what our pedant did not do. His 1930s are as far away from today's politics as the Crusades.

The Mufti was pro-Hitler from the minute the German came to power, because Hitler's hatred of the Jews accorded with his own opposition to the Zionist colonizers. But the new Berlin regime was too weak to exterminate the Jews immediately. Forced emigration became the Nazis' practical strategy, and Palestine soon was perceived as the ideal dumping ground for Germany's Jews. Everywhere else their agitation harmed German trade. In Palestine, they would be talking only to other Jews. By August 1933, the Nazis and Zionists worked out the HaAvara, or Transfer Agreement, whereby Jews emigrating to Palestine were allowed to take out $5,000 in export goods, while having to pay a smaller flight tax than emigrants to any other country. This left-handed patronage of Zionism proved decisive for that movement, as the sudden flow of immigrants and capital began crucially to shift the demographic and economic advantage away from the native Palestinians.

Despite their hatred for the Jews, the Nazis had no sympathy for the Palestinians. As early as 1920, Hitler emphasized that

> as a folkish man . . . I may not, simply because of my knowledge of their racial inferiority, link my nation's fate with that of these so-called "oppressed nations." (p. 83)

German envoys on the spot, most of them not Nazis, had more realistic considerations, citing "the notorious political

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unreliability of the Arabs" (p. 91). More important for Germany's prewar diplomacy, Hitler always planned to expand into Eastern Europe, and he thought he could win London's support for his ambitions on a basis of mutual anticommunism. But to do this he had to reassure Britain that he meant no challenge to its empire. Germany's policy did not change even when the British contemplated establishing a Zionist statelet, in 1937. Hitler wasn't pleased. He didn't want a Jewish Vatican, as he put it. But the Nazi party in Palestine (there were 2,000 Germans there then) was under strict orders not to aid the Palestinians, who were then in revolt against the British. Later, in 1938–39, the Nazis made some feeble efforts to involve themselves with the Palestinians, but Nicosia is correct to depreciate these as really aimed at pressuring Britain to come to terms concerning Europe rather than at helping the Mufti per sé.

Germany's policies shifted considerably once Hitler realized that war with Britain was inevitable, and eventually the Mufti began recruiting Muslims into SS units against the Soviet army and Tito's partisans. These episodes were disgraceful, and did not even succeed in winning the Nazis' support for the independence of Palestine, which they had consigned to Mussolini's new Roman empire.

The war period is beyond the scope of Nicosia's book, but he does quote later writings of some of Hitler's diplomats and generals, deploring their Führer's unwillingness genuinely to support Arab anti-colonialism against Britain before and during the war. But they, for all their Machiavellianism, only revealed their own naïveté. Hitler was a racist and imperialist—to say the very least—and it is absurd to think that he would have acted otherwise in this instance than he did.

**Revisionist History**


Reviewed by Ann M. Lesch5

In recent years, some Israeli scholars and journalists have taken a fresh and critical look at their own history, and particularly at the events surrounding the partition of Palestine and the emergence of Israel in the late 1940s. They have been aided in this endeavor by the increasing availability of private papers and government documents that reveal the inner decision-making process and the confidential views of key Israeli leaders.

Many Israelis find the conclusions of these studies shocking. They strike at the basic myths concerning the treatment of the Palestinians, attitudes toward Jewish immigrants from Arab countries, and relations between secular-oriented politicians and the Jewish religious community. Currently, controversy is focused on the writings of the journalist Benny Morris, who used declassified materials to prove that the government supported the Arab exodus in 1947–48 and that Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion directly ordered the expulsion of the Palestinians from Lydda and Ramleh in July 1948.6

Tom Segev, a journalist formerly with *Ha'aretz* and presently a coeditor of the weekly *Koterit Rashit*, likewise sparked de-

5Dr. Ann M. Lesch is a Middle East Associate with the Universities Field Staff International.