

the PA itself, but rather its absence or further fragmentation: "it is this apparent weakness of the PNA that gave it a particular force in the lives of West Bank Palestinians" (p. 145), by creating a sense of "collective possibility" (p. 165).

Law, Violence and Sovereignty elegantly uses sociolegal scholarship in its examination of the everyday application of the law among West Bank Palestinians. Although this method enriches our understanding of Palestinian politics, the contribution that the Palestinian case makes to legal anthropology or to sociolegal studies is not as clear. The empirical material ultimately offers a critique of the constitutive theory of the law, despite references made to many of its advocates. However, the book never completes the circle by theorizing about how the law has journeyed through Palestine. What could have enabled such an inquiry would have been a more sustained discussion in the second chapter of the other traditions and imagined and ethical communities that compete with the law. These comments notwithstanding, the book accomplishes what it sets out to do. In the process, it produces a fascinating deconstruction of the Israeli state and gives us a fresh look at the power of the PA, understood as stemming from its weakness.

DIVIDE AND CONQUER

Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948, by Hillel Cohen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. viii + 268 pages. Notes to p. 315. Bibliography to p. 325. Index to p. 344. \$45.00 cloth; \$18.95 paper.

Reviewed by Lenni Brenner

Hillel Cohen must be congratulated for the quality of *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948*. This accurate and finely detailed book will be assured a permanent place in Palestinian nationalist historiography. While Cohen is a declared Zionist, there are no signs that his politics distorted his scholarship, which is based on declassified Zionist reports, British

colonial archives, and captured Arab documents. He carefully describes how Zionists took advantage of "the fissures that cut through Palestinian society—between villagers, city dwellers, and Bedouin, between the rival families of the urban elite, between classes, between ethnic and religious groups" (p. 7) to defeat the right-wing Palestinian nationalist leadership of that era.

Victory in World War I gave Britain control of parts of the Ottoman Empire (today's Palestine/Israel and Jordan) that were so economically backward that many Palestinians eagerly sought posts in the new regime. They openly or covertly sold land to the Zionist movement, despite Britain's official intent under the League of Nations mandate to turn their country into a "Jewish national home." Zionists owned 420,000 dunams (4 dunams = 1 acre) of Palestine in 1917. "By 1930 the Jewish population owned 1,200,000 dunams, of which about 450,000 had been purchased from foreign landowners, approximately 680,000 from local owners of large estates, and the remaining 75,000 from fellahin smallholders" (p. 32). Cohen says that "although most of this land was sold by large landowners, it is important to remember that numerically there were many times more fellahin who sold land to the Zionists. . . . This means that thousands of Arabs . . . acted contrary to the norms laid down by their national movement" (pp. 32–33).

Two rural elements produced frequent collaborators. In their minds, Bedouins were members of—and therefore loyal to—their tribe, not an Arab nation. Many sold land to Zionists and even became public guards of such properties, or acted as informers against nationalists attacking such institutions. Furthermore, under the Ottomans, clusters of Palestinian villages had been united into administrative units (*nawabi*) controlled by shaykhs from locally dominant families, who acted as tax collectors. The urban-based British administration did not recognize the *nawabi* system, however, and some shaykhs drifted into collaboration, covertly buying land for the Zionists to make up for the loss of administrative and tax-collecting income. One secret land broker "claimed that wealthy city Arabs who made interest-bearing loans to the fellahin were the main cause of land sales" (p. 81). In fact, "the British viewed them as swindlers who were trying to take advantage of both Jews and fellahin. In at least some cases Jews

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involved with them had the same impression" (p. 81).

Cohen also describes strategies in "a key document" of the Zionist Elected Assembly aimed at "deepen[ing] fissures within Palestinian society by separating the Bedouin from the rest of the population and fomenting conflict between Christians and Muslims (and Druze)" (p. 18). To achieve this, Cohen tells us that the Zionist Executive financed the activities of Arab pro-Zionist organizations like the Muslim National Associations (MNA), which petitioned the Mandate authorities on behalf of the Zionists. In 1921, for example, Hasan Shukri, mayor of Haifa and president of the MNA, sent a telegram to London regarding an Arab Palestinian nationalist delegation sent to Britain to argue against the Balfour Declaration: "We strongly protest against the attitude of the said delegation. . . . We consider the Jews as a brotherly people . . . helping us in the construction of our common country" (p. 15). In 1924, Zionist-funded Palestinian "farmers' parties" appeared, further implementing these divisive strategies. Composed mainly of men belonging to "leading regional families or families with land in the village, and not to the fellah class," they were designed to "maintain and deepen the divide between Arab villagers and urban Arabs and weaken the Arab nationalist movement" (p. 20).

In the long run, Ragheb Nashashibi's National Defense Party (NDP)—composed mainly of mayors and administrations of larger cities, wealthy merchants, and some prominent rural families—became the chief beneficiary of Zionist support. Members of the NDP proclaimed themselves anti-Zionist, but zest for office led Nashashibi to replace Musa al-Husayni, a relative of the Mufti of Jerusalem, after the British dismissed him as mayor of Jerusalem in the wake of anti-British riots in 1920. Cohen is correct in noting that the behavior of nationalists like the Mufti only served to reinforce NDP loyalty to Britain. Indeed, when the Mufti became the dominant nationalist leader, Arabs who disagreed with him, and often their relatives, became "traitors" subject to assassination. In his fanatic rightist nationalism, the Mufti never developed a strategy to win over the significant Palestinian minority, rich and poor, who felt they had no choice, economically, but to collaborate directly with Britain and indirectly with Zionism.

For all its detailed description of collaboration, the book would have benefited

from additional contextual material. In one instance, Cohen examines elections for various offices where the vote was restricted to the propertied. However, no detail is provided on property regulations or the distribution of votes for the various parties. Similarly, he explores the topic of Bedouin collaboration without touching on what percentage of the total population Bedouins made up and what percentage of them collaborated with the Zionists. But such omissions, important as they are, do not significantly detract from the high scholarly quality of Cohen's work.

ARCHITECTURAL ASSOCIATIONS

The Dome of the Rock, by Oleg Grabar. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. ix + 212 pages. Bibliography to p. 222. Index to p. 234. \$22.95 hard.

Reviewed by Finbarr Barry Flood

This short, engaging book represents half a century of reflection on what is at once the most familiar and enigmatic of Islamic monuments by its preeminent modern biographer. Combining formal analysis with epigraphic and textual exegesis, and drawing upon recent archaeological discoveries in and around Jerusalem, Oleg Grabar constructs a broad context for his diachronic account of the monument.

More than half of *The Dome of the Rock* dwells on the formative seventh century. The first chapter deals with Jerusalem and the Temple Mount before and after the Arab conquest of the city in the 630s, emphasizing a growing awareness that the late seventh-century Marwanid architectural project on the Haram al-Sharif may have been planned in embryonic form as early as the caliphate of Mu'awiyya (ruled 661–80 C.E.). The long second chapter discusses the

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